Abstract
We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues in
contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political
elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political
power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a
panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political
concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration
perform worse.
contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political
elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political
power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a
panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political
concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration
perform worse.
| Translated title of the contribution | RECAUDO DEL IMPUESTO A LA PROPIEDAD RURAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE CONCENTRACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y COMPETENCIA POLÍTICA: : EVIDENCIA PARA COLOMBIA |
|---|---|
| Original language | English (US) |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| State | Published - 2016 |