Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition: Evidence from Colombia

Juan Fernando Vargas Duque, Marta Juanita Villaveces Nino

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues in
contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political
elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political
power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a
panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political
concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration
perform worse.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages29
StatePublished - 2016

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Tax revenues
Economics
Political competition
Property tax
Political power
Colombia
Tax
Elite capture
Public Administration
Municipalities

Cite this

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