Abstract
contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political
elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political
power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a
panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political
concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration
perform worse.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Number of pages | 29 |
| State | Published - 2016 |
Fingerprint
Cite this
}
Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition : Evidence from Colombia. / Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Villaveces Nino, Marta Juanita.
2016.Research output: Working paper
TY - UNPB
T1 - Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition
T2 - Evidence from Colombia
AU - Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando
AU - Villaveces Nino, Marta Juanita
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues incontemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local politicalelites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto politicalpower is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using apanel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high politicalconcentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentrationperform worse.
AB - We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues incontemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local politicalelites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto politicalpower is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using apanel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high politicalconcentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentrationperform worse.
UR - http://www.scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/945/VargasVilavecesforCAF.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
M3 - Working paper
BT - Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition
ER -