Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition

Evidence from Colombia

Título traducido de la contribución: RECAUDO DEL IMPUESTO A LA PROPIEDAD RURAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE CONCENTRACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y COMPETENCIA POLÍTICA: : EVIDENCIA PARA COLOMBIA

Juan Fernando Vargas Duque, Marta Juanita Villaveces Nino

Resultado de la investigación: Documento de Trabajo

Resumen

Este trabajo estudia la relación existente entre dos fuentes distintas de poder político y el
recaudo del impuesto a la propiedad rural en Colombia. Primero, el poder político de jure
captura hasta qué medida las élites políticas locales pueden capturar la administración pública
para su beneficio personal. Segundo, el poder político de facto captura la capacidad de los
terratenientes poderosos económicamente de influenciar las políticas locales. El trabajo explota
un panel de todos los municipios colombianos y muestra que los lugares con alta concentración
económica o alta concentración política experimentan un mayor recudo, pero los lugares con
altos niveles de los dos tipos de concentración tienen un peor desempeño tributario.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Número de páginas29
EstadoPublished - 2016

Huella dactilar

Tax revenues
Economics
Political competition
Property tax
Political power
Colombia
Tax
Elite capture
Public Administration
Municipalities

Citar esto

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abstract = "We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues incontemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local politicalelites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto politicalpower is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using apanel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high politicalconcentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentrationperform worse.",
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AB - We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues incontemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local politicalelites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto politicalpower is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using apanel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high politicalconcentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentrationperform worse.

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