Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence

Título traducido de la contribución: La compatibilidad de los productos como estrategia para obstaculizar la disuasión de la entrada

Resultado de la investigación: Documento de TrabajoArtículo de discusión

Resumen

En muchos mercados, las empresas producen y venden componentes complementarios que forman un sistema de productos. Este artículo estudia los efectos de la compatibilidad en la publicidad de productos y las decisiones de entrada en un mercado de productos diferenciado. Mientras que la publicidad mejora la capacidad de los consumidores para mezclar y ajustar los componentes más cerca de sus preferencias, más publicidad no siempre genera un mayor bienestar. En mi modelo, un operador tradicional utiliza la publicidad para aumentar las perspectivas de competencia en el mercado con el objetivo de disuadir la entrada potencial. Sin embargo, en algunos parámetros, la disuasión de entrada no se produce cuando los productos se hacen compatibles. Con productos compatibles, el operador tradicional obtiene grandes beneficios del alojamiento o de los equilibrios cuando todos los consumidores son conscientes de la existencia de los productos disponibles. En este último caso, la cantidad de publicidad no puede ampliarse más para proteger la posición monopolística del operador tradicional. Como resultado, las políticas a favor de la compatibilidad pueden fomentar la entrada y generar mayores niveles de publicidad.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Lugar de publicaciónBogotá
EditorialUniversidad del Rosario
Páginas1-32
Número de páginas32
EstadoPublished - 2017

Huella dactilar

Entry deterrence
Compatibility
Incumbents
Accommodation
Competitive market
Industry
Market competition

Citar esto

Roig Roig, G. (2017). Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence. (205 ed.) (pp. 1-32). Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
Roig Roig, Guillem. / Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence. 205. ed. Bogotá : Universidad del Rosario, 2017. pp. 1-32
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abstract = "In many markets, firms produce and sell complementary components that form a product system. This paper studies the effects of compatibility in product advertisement, and how the available information in the market affects the decision of a company to become active in the industry. While advertising enhances the ability of consumers to mix and match components closer to their preferences, more advertising does not always generate larger welfare. In my model, an incumbent uses advertising to increase the prospects of market competition with the objective to deter potential entry. However, under some parameters of the model, entry deterrence does not occur when products are made compatible. With compatible products, the incumbent either obtains large benefits from accommodation or equilibria when all consumers are aware of the existence of the available products emerge. In this latter case, the amount of advertising cannot be further expanded to protect the incumbent's monopolistic position. As a result, policies that encourage compatibility may generate higher advertisement levels and a more competitive market.",
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Roig Roig, G 2017 'Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence' 205 ed., Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, pp. 1-32.

Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence. / Roig Roig, Guillem.

205. ed. Bogotá : Universidad del Rosario, 2017. p. 1-32.

Resultado de la investigación: Documento de TrabajoArtículo de discusión

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Roig Roig G. Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence. 205 ed. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario. 2017, p. 1-32.