Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

Corinne Chaton; Farid Gasmi; Marie Laure Guillerminet; Juan D. Oviedo

Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie Laure Guillerminet, Juan D. Oviedo

Universidad del Rosario

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

Título traducido de la contribución	Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
Idioma original	Francés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	475-486
Número de páginas	12
Publicación	Revue Economique
Volumen	59
N.º	3
Estado	Publicada - 2008

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

Economía, econometría y finanzas (todo)

Otros archivos y enlaces

Citar esto

@article{e406b47c50c440deb75a861e87afe969,

title = "Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release",

abstract = "This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.",

author = "Corinne Chaton and Farid Gasmi and Guillerminet, {Marie Laure} and Oviedo, {Juan D.}",

year = "2008",

language = "Franc{\'e}s",

volume = "59",

pages = "475--486",

journal = "Revue Economique",

issn = "0035-2764",

publisher = "Presses de Sciences Po",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

AU - Chaton, Corinne

AU - Gasmi, Farid

AU - Guillerminet, Marie Laure

AU - Oviedo, Juan D.

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

AB - This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67649212631&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=67649212631&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Artículo

AN - SCOPUS:67649212631

SN - 0035-2764

VL - 59

SP - 475

EP - 486

JO - Revue Economique

JF - Revue Economique

IS - 3

ER -

Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

Resumen

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

Otros archivos y enlaces

Huella

Citar esto