Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

Translated title of the contribution: Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition

Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie Laure Guillerminet, Juan D. Oviedo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

Translated title of the contributionGas release as a short term instrument to foster competition
Original languageFrench
Pages (from-to)475-486
Number of pages12
JournalRevue Economique
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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