TY - GEN
T1 - Self-Organized Division of Cognitive Labor
AU - Andrade-Lotero, Edgar
AU - Goldstone, Robert L.
N1 - Funding Information:
EAL was partially supported by the following research awards from Universidad del Rosario: “Becas para Estancias de Do-cencia e Investigación, 2018 and “Fondo de Capital Semilla, 2018”. EAL is also grateful with Luis Andrade for useful discussions. Both authors are grateful with Evan Nix for running the experimental sessions, and with the anonymous referees at CogSci2019 for useful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© Cognitive Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation, CogSci 2019.All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The division of labor phenomenon has been observed with respect to both manual and cognitive labor, but there is no clear understanding of the intra- and inter-individual mechanisms that allow for its emergence, especially when there are multiple divisions possible and communication is limited. Situations fitting this description include individuals in a group splitting a geographical region for resource harvesting without explicit negotiation, or a couple tacitly negotiating the hour of the day for each to shower so that there is sufficient hot water. We studied this phenomenon by means of an iterative two-person game where multiple divisions are possible, but no explicit communication is allowed. Our results suggest that there are a limited number of biases toward divisions of labor, which serve as attractors in the dynamics of dyadic coordination. However, unlike Schelling's focal points, these biases do not attract players' attention at the onset of the interaction, but are only revealed and consolidated by the in-game dynamics of dyadic interaction.
AB - The division of labor phenomenon has been observed with respect to both manual and cognitive labor, but there is no clear understanding of the intra- and inter-individual mechanisms that allow for its emergence, especially when there are multiple divisions possible and communication is limited. Situations fitting this description include individuals in a group splitting a geographical region for resource harvesting without explicit negotiation, or a couple tacitly negotiating the hour of the day for each to shower so that there is sufficient hot water. We studied this phenomenon by means of an iterative two-person game where multiple divisions are possible, but no explicit communication is allowed. Our results suggest that there are a limited number of biases toward divisions of labor, which serve as attractors in the dynamics of dyadic coordination. However, unlike Schelling's focal points, these biases do not attract players' attention at the onset of the interaction, but are only revealed and consolidated by the in-game dynamics of dyadic interaction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85139422421&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85139422421&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85139422421
T3 - Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation, CogSci 2019
SP - 91
EP - 97
BT - Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
PB - The Cognitive Science Society
T2 - 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation, CogSci 2019
Y2 - 24 July 2019 through 27 July 2019
ER -