TY - JOUR
T1 - Ownership and control in Colombian corporations
AU - Gutiérrez, Luis H.
AU - Pombo, Carlos
AU - Taborda, Rodrigo
N1 - Funding Information:
We are indebted to the following persons and institutions, without whose collaboration it would have been impossible to undertake this research: Dr. Clemente del Valle (Superintendent of Securities), Dr. Rodolfo Dainez (Superintendent for Commercial Societies), Dr. Alberto Florez (Delegate Superintendent for Equity Issuers). Roberto Fortich provided research assistance. Financial support from the IADB Research Network is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2008/2
Y1 - 2008/2
N2 - We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20% fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers.
AB - We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20% fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.qref.2006.01.002
DO - 10.1016/j.qref.2006.01.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38649137729
SN - 1062-9769
VL - 48
SP - 22
EP - 47
JO - Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
JF - Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
IS - 1
ER -