Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to present in a deductive way, solutions for general games played
under normal conditions following competitive paths, applying core principles of Nash equilibrium. Here
the normal approach implies strategic choices available for each player, formulated and implemented
without any information concerning specific choices to be made by others players. It is convenient to
keep in mind that John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern outlined a set of conditions for Nash
equilibrium for a game in normal form, proposed as the basic framework to analyze the conditions and
requirements for a particular Nash equilibrium to be the solution of the game. Theorems that exhibit
imbedding relations among the Nash equilibriums of the game are given to examine the role of pre-play
communication and the imbedding order in equilibrium selection. A core argument to claim here is that a
generic case of Nash equilibriums that are strategically unstable relative to maxi-min strategies is given
to emphasize the role of moves of the third kind and pre-play communication in correlated and
coordinated solutions and the need to account for cases where Nash equilibriums are not plausible or
even desirable as solutions for a game in normal form.
under normal conditions following competitive paths, applying core principles of Nash equilibrium. Here
the normal approach implies strategic choices available for each player, formulated and implemented
without any information concerning specific choices to be made by others players. It is convenient to
keep in mind that John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern outlined a set of conditions for Nash
equilibrium for a game in normal form, proposed as the basic framework to analyze the conditions and
requirements for a particular Nash equilibrium to be the solution of the game. Theorems that exhibit
imbedding relations among the Nash equilibriums of the game are given to examine the role of pre-play
communication and the imbedding order in equilibrium selection. A core argument to claim here is that a
generic case of Nash equilibriums that are strategically unstable relative to maxi-min strategies is given
to emphasize the role of moves of the third kind and pre-play communication in correlated and
coordinated solutions and the need to account for cases where Nash equilibriums are not plausible or
even desirable as solutions for a game in normal form.
| Original language | Spanish (Colombia) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-7 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 1 2019 |