TY - JOUR
T1 - Economic incentives and political inequality in the management of environmental public goods
AU - Bogliacino, Francesco
AU - Mantilla, César
AU - Niño, Daniel
N1 - Funding Information:
Daniel and Francesco acknowledge financial support from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Convocatoria Jóvenes Investigadores 2019 . Francesco thanks Universidad Nacional de Colombia for financial support (Project 18810 ). César thanks financial support from the program “ Inclusión productiva y social: programas y políticas para la promoción de una economía formal, código 60185, que conforma la Alianza EFI, bajo el Contrato de Recuperación Contingente No. FP44842-220-2018 .”. We thank Camilo Gomez, Felipe Montealegre, Ferney Rincón, and Rafael Charris who helped with data collection. We appreciate comments from Yady Barrero and Alexander Rincón, who commented on Daniel’s Master thesis on which this work is partly built, and from participants to various seminars and conferences, including BEBES. We appreciated comments from Pietro Ortoleva. Comments from the Editor and two anonymous referees were very helpful. The usual disclaimer applies.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2023/6
Y1 - 2023/6
N2 - We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation. Participants vote for their selfishly preferred quota between half and two-thirds of the time. Although setting quotas decreased aggregate extraction by roughly 10%, we do not find differences between treatments. Once quotas are removed, extraction rises back to inefficient levels. Our results suggest that, although participants are reciprocal, they neglect the positive equilibrium effects of a stricter regulation.
AB - We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation. Participants vote for their selfishly preferred quota between half and two-thirds of the time. Although setting quotas decreased aggregate extraction by roughly 10%, we do not find differences between treatments. Once quotas are removed, extraction rises back to inefficient levels. Our results suggest that, although participants are reciprocal, they neglect the positive equilibrium effects of a stricter regulation.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102006
DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85150286341
SN - 2214-8043
VL - 104
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
M1 - 102006
ER -
