A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans Theo Normann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

219 Scopus citations

Abstract

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)321-338
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume72
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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