TY - JOUR
T1 - A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
AU - Blanco, Mariana
AU - Engelmann, Dirk
AU - Normann, Hans Theo
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ We are grateful to Volker Benndorf, Martin Dufwenberg, Ernst Fehr, Werner Güth, Wieland Müller, Nikos Nikiforakis, Klaus Schmidt, Avner Shaked, an anonymous referee and seminar and conference audiences at Autonoma University Barcelona, Ben-Gurion University, CERGE-EI Prague, Economic Science Association Alessandria, Nottingham and Tucson, Edinburgh Workshop on Behavioural and Experimental Economics, European Economic Association Vienna, Exeter University, Humboldt University Berlin, Innsbruck University, Köln University, Lund University, Maastricht University, Mannheim University, Max Planck Institutes Bonn and Jena, Paris I Sorbonne, Royal Economic Society Nottingham, Royal Holloway, Symposium on Psychology and Economics Tilburg, Tilburg University and Verein für Socialpolitik Bayreuth for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to Juan Vargas for his support at various stages of this research. Substantial parts of this research were conducted while all authors were at Royal Holloway, University of London. We thank Royal Holloway for supporting this research. Mariana Blanco thanks the Overseas Research Student Awards Scheme for financial support. Dirk Engelmann acknowledges financial support from the institutional research grant AV0Z70850503 of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, v.v.i. * Corresponding author at: University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, L7, 3-5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Blanco), [email protected] (D. Engelmann), [email protected] (H.T. Normann).
PY - 2011/6
Y1 - 2011/6
N2 - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.
AB - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008
M3 - Research Article
AN - SCOPUS:79956364035
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 72
SP - 321
EP - 338
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -
