Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

Juan Camilo Cárdenas, César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a Revista › Artículo

6 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Este documento reconsidera la evidencia de los juegos experimentales de recursos de piscina común
desde la perspectiva de un modelo de muestreo de resultados. A pesar de estar libre de parámetros, el modelo
es capaz de replicar algunas de las características más llamativas de los datos, incluyendo la frecuencia de un solo pico
el uso persistente de acciones estrictamente dominadas y una heterogeneidad estable en
opciones. Estas propiedades también pueden ser replicadas con precisión utilizando la respuesta cuántica logit
equilibrio (QRE), pero sólo sintonizando el parámetro libre por separado para juegos separados.
Cuando el parámetro QRE se limita a ser el mismo en todos los juegos, el equilibrio de muestreo
proporciona un ajuste superior a los datos. Argumentamos que es probable que estos hallazgos se generalicen a
otros juegos complejos con múltiples jugadores y estrategias.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)299-317
Número de páginas19
PublicaciónGames
Volumen6
N.º3
DOI
EstadoPublished - jul 23 2015
Publicado de forma externaSí

Huella dactilar

Game
Sampling
Resources
Tuning
Logit
Strictly
Likely
Generalise
Common pool resources
Model
Quantal response equilibrium
Evidence
Strategy

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Citar esto

Cárdenas, J. C., Mantilla, C., & Sethi, R. (2015). Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games. Games, 6(3), 299-317. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
Cárdenas, Juan Camilo ; Mantilla, César ; Sethi, Rajiv. / Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games. En: Games. 2015 ; Vol. 6, N.º 3. pp. 299-317.
@article{088d8a25dfd6407f9f3e76ffa017594d,
title = "Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games",
abstract = "This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.",
author = "C{\'a}rdenas, {Juan Camilo} and C{\'e}sar Mantilla and Rajiv Sethi",
year = "2015",
month = "7",
day = "23",
doi = "10.3390/g6030299",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "6",
pages = "299--317",
journal = "Games",
issn = "2073-4336",
publisher = "Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)",
number = "3",

}

Cárdenas, JC, Mantilla, C & Sethi, R 2015, 'Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games', Games, vol. 6, n.º 3, pp. 299-317. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games. / Cárdenas, Juan Camilo; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv.

En: Games, Vol. 6, N.º 3, 23.07.2015, p. 299-317.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a Revista › Artículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

AU - Cárdenas, Juan Camilo

AU - Mantilla, César

AU - Sethi, Rajiv

PY - 2015/7/23

Y1 - 2015/7/23

N2 - This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.

AB - This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84940913618&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84940913618&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3390/g6030299

DO - 10.3390/g6030299

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84940913618

VL - 6

SP - 299

EP - 317

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

IS - 3

ER -

Cárdenas JC, Mantilla C, Sethi R. Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games. Games. 2015 jul 23;6(3):299-317. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299

Acceso al documento