How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2

Royce Carroll, Gary W. Cox, Mónica Pachón

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaRevisión Literaria

43 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega-seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega-seats - cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs - in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega-seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega-seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)153-174
Número de páginas22
PublicaciónLegislative Studies Quarterly
DOI
EstadoPublished - may 1 2006
Publicado de forma externa

Huella dactilar

party system
candidacy
election
leader
governance
democracy
experience

Citar esto

Carroll, Royce ; Cox, Gary W. ; Pachón, Mónica. / How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2. En: Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2006 ; pp. 153-174.
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How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2. / Carroll, Royce; Cox, Gary W.; Pachón, Mónica.

En: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 01.05.2006, p. 153-174.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaRevisión Literaria

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AU - Cox, Gary W.

AU - Pachón, Mónica

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