Resumen
Idioma original | English (US) |
---|---|
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 153-174 |
Número de páginas | 22 |
Publicación | Legislative Studies Quarterly |
DOI | |
Estado | Published - may 1 2006 |
Publicado de forma externa | Sí |
Huella dactilar
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How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2. / Carroll, Royce; Cox, Gary W.; Pachón, Mónica.
En: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 01.05.2006, p. 153-174.Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a Revista › Revisión Literaria
TY - JOUR
T1 - How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2
AU - Carroll, Royce
AU - Cox, Gary W.
AU - Pachón, Mónica
PY - 2006/5/1
Y1 - 2006/5/1
N2 - Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega-seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega-seats - cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs - in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega-seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega-seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.
AB - Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call "mega-seats." We consider the selection of three different types of mega-seats - cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs - in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega-seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega-seats (one important payoff of "winning"), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.
U2 - 10.3162/036298006X201760
DO - 10.3162/036298006X201760
M3 - Literature review
SP - 153
EP - 174
JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly
JF - Legislative Studies Quarterly
SN - 0362-9805
ER -