Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets

Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie Laure Guillerminet, Juan Daniel Oviedo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

3 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Motivated by policy events experienced during the last two decades by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to imports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent. We then analyze the effect of the "artificial" duopoly created by the regulator when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, using information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Besides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regulatory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas competition.

Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)1251-1258
Número de páginas8
PublicaciónEnergy Economics
Volumen34
N.º5
DOI
EstadoPublished - sep 2012

Huella dactilar

Gases
Gas
Capacity investment
Gas market
Gas industry
Charge transfer
Natural gas
Economics
Costs
Industry
Marketers
Scenarios
Incumbents

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Energy(all)

Citar esto

Chaton, Corinne ; Gasmi, Farid ; Guillerminet, Marie Laure ; Oviedo, Juan Daniel. / Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets. En: Energy Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 34, N.º 5. pp. 1251-1258.
@article{d8d0bc515983455286258584600d3bee,
title = "Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets",
abstract = "Motivated by policy events experienced during the last two decades by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to imports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent. We then analyze the effect of the {"}artificial{"} duopoly created by the regulator when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, using information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Besides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regulatory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas competition.",
author = "Corinne Chaton and Farid Gasmi and Guillerminet, {Marie Laure} and Oviedo, {Juan Daniel}",
year = "2012",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1016/j.eneco.2012.06.007",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "34",
pages = "1251--1258",
journal = "Energy Economics",
issn = "0140-9883",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "5",

}

Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets. / Chaton, Corinne; Gasmi, Farid; Guillerminet, Marie Laure; Oviedo, Juan Daniel.

En: Energy Economics, Vol. 34, N.º 5, 09.2012, p. 1251-1258.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets

AU - Chaton, Corinne

AU - Gasmi, Farid

AU - Guillerminet, Marie Laure

AU - Oviedo, Juan Daniel

PY - 2012/9

Y1 - 2012/9

N2 - Motivated by policy events experienced during the last two decades by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to imports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent. We then analyze the effect of the "artificial" duopoly created by the regulator when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, using information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Besides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regulatory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas competition.

AB - Motivated by policy events experienced during the last two decades by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to imports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent. We then analyze the effect of the "artificial" duopoly created by the regulator when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, using information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Besides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regulatory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas competition.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84862625659&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84862625659&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.06.007

DO - 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.06.007

M3 - Article

VL - 34

SP - 1251

EP - 1258

JO - Energy Economics

JF - Energy Economics

SN - 0140-9883

IS - 5

ER -