In a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and in- vestment which affects the market structure of the supply side of the market. We show that more competitive equilibria are associated with a larger and more homogeneous distribution of investment among active suppliers, and an equilibrium with no investment might occur when competition is mild. In our model, buyer’s investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition, and its effectiveness is positively related to the level of competition ex-post. In general, the equilibrium investment profile is lower than efficiency, and we surprisingly find that higher competitive markets may sustain a larger number of suppliers.
|Idioma original||Inglés estadounidense|
|Número de páginas||44|
|Estado||Publicada - mar. 2014|
|Nombre||TSE Working Papers|
|Editor||Toulouse School of Economics|
- Economía, econometría y finanzas (todo)