Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release

Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie Laure Guillerminet, Juan D. Oviedo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

Idioma originalFrench
Páginas (desde-hasta)475-486
Número de páginas12
PublicaciónRevue Economique
Volumen59
N.º3
EstadoPublished - 2008

Huella dactilar

Incumbents
Gas
Scenarios
Natural gas
Calibration
Duopoly
Gas market
Simulation
Budget balance

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Citar esto

Chaton, C., Gasmi, F., Guillerminet, M. L., & Oviedo, J. D. (2008). Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release. Revue Economique, 59(3), 475-486.
Chaton, Corinne ; Gasmi, Farid ; Guillerminet, Marie Laure ; Oviedo, Juan D. / Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release. En: Revue Economique. 2008 ; Vol. 59, N.º 3. pp. 475-486.
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Chaton, C, Gasmi, F, Guillerminet, ML & Oviedo, JD 2008, 'Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release', Revue Economique, vol. 59, n.º 3, pp. 475-486.

Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release. / Chaton, Corinne; Gasmi, Farid; Guillerminet, Marie Laure; Oviedo, Juan D.

En: Revue Economique, Vol. 59, N.º 3, 2008, p. 475-486.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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