To suggest is to commit? A common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations

Título traducido de la contribución: ¿Sugerir es comprometerse? Un experimento de recursos comunes con recomendaciones que no se pueden hacer cumplir

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

Resumen

2015 Elsevier Inc. informo sobre los resultados de un experimento de campo con pescadores artesanales colombianos. Establecí un juego de recursos comunes en el que los sujetos intercambian recomendaciones antes de la decisión de extracción. La tensión clásica de este juego entre incentivos individuales y colectivos abre la puerta a la comunicación estratégica. Sin embargo, considero que los temas son muy coherentes con el mensaje transmitido y, hasta cierto punto, responden a la recomendación entrante. Las recomendaciones mejoran la eficiencia: los niveles de extracción son más bajos cuando los mensajes salientes y los entrantes están más cerca unos de otros. Esto es particularmente relevante en tratamientos con una alta proporción de recomendaciones cooperativas. Vinculo el comportamiento experimental con los datos de la encuesta y encuentro que el comportamiento mentiroso está negativamente correlacionado con la relación entre las ganancias satisfactorias (reportadas) y las realizadas por los pescadores.

Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)13-20
Número de páginas8
PublicaciónJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
N.º59
DOI
EstadoPublished - dic 1 2015

Huella dactilar

experiment
resources
Motivation
Communication
incentive
efficiency
communication
Experiment
Common pool resources
Surveys and Questionnaires
Survey data
Proportion
Strategic communication
Field experiment
Incentives

Citar esto

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title = "To suggest is to commit? A common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations",
abstract = "{\circledC} 2015 Elsevier Inc.I report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives opens the door for strategic communication. However, I find that subjects are highly consistent with their transmitted message and, to some extent, responsive to the incoming recommendation. Recommendations are efficiency enhancing: extraction levels are lower when the outgoing and the incoming messages are closer to each other. This is particularly relevant in treatments with a high proportion of cooperative recommendations. I link experimental behavior with survey data and I find that lying behavior is negatively correlated with the ratio between the (reported) satisfactory and realized earnings from the fishermen.",
author = "Cesar Mantilla",
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To suggest is to commit? A common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations. / Mantilla, Cesar.

En: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics , N.º 59, 01.12.2015, p. 13-20.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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N2 - © 2015 Elsevier Inc.I report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives opens the door for strategic communication. However, I find that subjects are highly consistent with their transmitted message and, to some extent, responsive to the incoming recommendation. Recommendations are efficiency enhancing: extraction levels are lower when the outgoing and the incoming messages are closer to each other. This is particularly relevant in treatments with a high proportion of cooperative recommendations. I link experimental behavior with survey data and I find that lying behavior is negatively correlated with the ratio between the (reported) satisfactory and realized earnings from the fishermen.

AB - © 2015 Elsevier Inc.I report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives opens the door for strategic communication. However, I find that subjects are highly consistent with their transmitted message and, to some extent, responsive to the incoming recommendation. Recommendations are efficiency enhancing: extraction levels are lower when the outgoing and the incoming messages are closer to each other. This is particularly relevant in treatments with a high proportion of cooperative recommendations. I link experimental behavior with survey data and I find that lying behavior is negatively correlated with the ratio between the (reported) satisfactory and realized earnings from the fishermen.

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DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2015.09.001

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JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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