Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence

Título traducido de la contribución: Redes de comunicación en juegos de recursos comunes: Pruebas experimentales de campo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

3 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

2015 Elsevier B.V.Exploramos el papel de las redes de comunicación y los tipos de mensajes en el comportamiento en un juego de recursos comunes. En un experimento de campo artefactual, introducimos dos estructuras de red que permiten a los participantes transmitir sugerencias no vinculantes a los otros actores con los que estaban conectados. Estudiamos el efecto de estas redes en los beneficios de los sujetos. En una red centralizada, las sugerencias "malas" (que se miran a sí mismas) tienen un efecto negativo y permanente, mientras que las "buenas" (cooperativas) tienen un efecto nulo (o incluso negativo) debido a su limitada credibilidad. En una red descentralizada, el efecto positivo de las "buenas" sugerencias es permanente (aunque menor que en la red centralizada), mientras que las "malas" tienen un efecto más limitado. Aunque la asignación a posiciones en la red es exógena, encontramos una correlación positiva entre la centralidad de la red y otros comportamientos en la transmisión de mensajes "buenos" y "malos".
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)215-226
Número de páginas12
PublicaciónJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volumen118
DOI
EstadoPublished - oct 1 2015
Publicado de forma externa

Huella dactilar

Common pool resources
Communication networks
Network structure
Network centrality
Credibility
Field experiment

Citar esto

@article{efbdc0a183e8415caf0dbca95d1b5001,
title = "Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence",
abstract = "{\circledC} 2015 Elsevier B.V.We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, {"}bad{"} (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas {"}good{"} (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of {"}good{"} suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while {"}bad{"} suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting {"}good{"} and {"}bad{"} messages.",
author = "C{\'e}sar Mantilla",
year = "2015",
month = "10",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "118",
pages = "215--226",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence. / Mantilla, César.

En: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 118, 01.10.2015, p. 215-226.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence

AU - Mantilla, César

PY - 2015/10/1

Y1 - 2015/10/1

N2 - © 2015 Elsevier B.V.We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, "bad" (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas "good" (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of "good" suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while "bad" suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting "good" and "bad" messages.

AB - © 2015 Elsevier B.V.We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, "bad" (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas "good" (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of "good" suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while "bad" suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting "good" and "bad" messages.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003

M3 - Article

VL - 118

SP - 215

EP - 226

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -