Rebellion, Repression and Welfare

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. © 2011 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)563-579
Número de páginas17
PublicaciónDefence and Peace Economics
DOI
EstadoPublished - oct 1 2011

Huella dactilar

repression
welfare
social conflict
political power
peace
elite
incentive
Military
anxiety
costs
Group
Rebellion
Society
Peace
Grievance
Welfare loss
Social conflict
Political power
Elites
Costs

Citar esto

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Rebellion, Repression and Welfare. / Vargas, Juan F.

En: Defence and Peace Economics, 01.10.2011, p. 563-579.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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