Ownership and control in Colombian corporations

Luis H. Gutiérrez, Carlos Pombo, Rodrigo Taborda

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

13 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20% fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers. © 2006.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)22-47
Número de páginas26
PublicaciónQuarterly Review of Economics and Finance
DOI
EstadoPublished - feb 1 2008

Huella dactilar

Ownership and control
Ownership
Voting rights
Cross-shareholding
Investment funds
Economic activity
European countries
Trust funds
Cash flow rights
Voting
Stakeholders
Colombia
Controller
Statistics

Citar esto

@article{bcbc7f1ba58c4953919713b633f41a53,
title = "Ownership and control in Colombian corporations",
abstract = "We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20{\%} fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers. {\circledC} 2006.",
author = "Guti{\'e}rrez, {Luis H.} and Carlos Pombo and Rodrigo Taborda",
year = "2008",
month = "2",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.qref.2006.01.002",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "22--47",
journal = "Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance",
issn = "1062-9769",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Ownership and control in Colombian corporations. / Gutiérrez, Luis H.; Pombo, Carlos; Taborda, Rodrigo.

En: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 01.02.2008, p. 22-47.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ownership and control in Colombian corporations

AU - Gutiérrez, Luis H.

AU - Pombo, Carlos

AU - Taborda, Rodrigo

PY - 2008/2/1

Y1 - 2008/2/1

N2 - We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20% fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers. © 2006.

AB - We study the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 non-financial listed corporations in Colombia during 1996-2002. When categorizing the sample according to listing status and economic activity, voting rights are greater than cash flow rights because of the indirect ownership common for firms belonging mainly to pyramidal and cross-shareholdings ownership schemes. The study sample also includes an important set of non-affiliated firms. Ownership statistics show high concentration for the four largest voting blocks, similar to levels observed in continental Europe, although the largest stakeholder has on average 20% fewer voting rights than the average observed in European countries. Finally, holding investment and trust funds play a central role as the holdings' ultimate controllers. © 2006.

U2 - 10.1016/j.qref.2006.01.002

DO - 10.1016/j.qref.2006.01.002

M3 - Article

SP - 22

EP - 47

JO - Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

JF - Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

SN - 1062-9769

ER -