TY - JOUR
T1 - On blame and reciprocity
T2 - Theory and experiments
AU - Çelen, Boğaçhan
AU - Schotter, Andrew
AU - Blanco, Mariana
N1 - Funding Information:
We appreciate very useful comments of two anonymous referees, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg, Colin Camerer, Matthew Rabin and Erkut ?zbay. Mi Luo provided excellent assistance on computational exercises. We are grateful to the participants of the CESS Experimental Economics Lunchtime Seminar, 2009 North-American ESA Conference, Amsterdam Workshop on Behavioral & Experimental Economics, Cornell University Behavioral Economics Workshop, Rutgers University, Brown University Microeconomics Seminar and SfED 2012 Winter Conference, University of Birmingham, University of Exeter, Melbourne University, Oxford University, Vienna University, Universitat de Barcelona, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Universitat Aut?noma de Barcelona, Freie Universit?t Berlin, California Institute of Technology, and UNSW for comments. We also acknowledge the partial financial support of the Center for Experimental Social Science at NYU.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Inc.
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2017/5/1
Y1 - 2017/5/1
N2 - The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory.
AB - The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does. If player j would act in a worse manner than player i, then we say that player j does not blame player i. If, however, player j would be nicer than player i, then we say that player j blames player i. We believe this notion is a natural, intuitive and empirically functional way to explain the motives of people engaging in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we test this concept by using data from two laboratory experiments and find significant support for the theory.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006
M3 - Research Article
AN - SCOPUS:85012024100
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 169
SP - 62
EP - 92
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -