Norms and trades: An experimental investigation

Giuseppe Danese, Luigi Mittone

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

In this paper we study how norms of symmetry and centricity affect the functioning of two ways to allocate resources described in the economic anthropology literature, namely reciprocity and redistribution. The baseline reciprocity study, with no explicit priming of the norm of symmetry, features near-zero levels of allocative efficiency. Consistent with the anthropological framework we use throughout, we find that priming the norm of symmetry among the players through pre-play communication dramatically increases efficiency. Next we study a game of redistribution and find that in the final stages of the game allocative efficiency levels consistently approach 100%, regardless of how the chief comes to acquire centricity in the group. We conclude that reciprocity and redistribution can seldom allocate resources efficiently in the absence of norms of symmetry and centricity in the institutional design. By way of comparison, we confirm a robust finding in the experimental economics literature that a simple market exchange game achieves high efficiency, even when the traders can formulate expectations about each other’s compliance with norms.

Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)259-282
Número de páginas24
PublicaciónRationality and Society
Volumen27
N.º3
DOI
EstadoPublished - ago 10 2015
Publicado de forma externa

Huella dactilar

reciprocity
redistribution
efficiency
resources
economics
anthropology
communication
market
Group
literature

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Sociology and Political Science

Citar esto

Danese, Giuseppe ; Mittone, Luigi. / Norms and trades : An experimental investigation. En: Rationality and Society. 2015 ; Vol. 27, N.º 3. pp. 259-282.
@article{ea4cedc586d6494ea449ce6589bef71f,
title = "Norms and trades: An experimental investigation",
abstract = "In this paper we study how norms of symmetry and centricity affect the functioning of two ways to allocate resources described in the economic anthropology literature, namely reciprocity and redistribution. The baseline reciprocity study, with no explicit priming of the norm of symmetry, features near-zero levels of allocative efficiency. Consistent with the anthropological framework we use throughout, we find that priming the norm of symmetry among the players through pre-play communication dramatically increases efficiency. Next we study a game of redistribution and find that in the final stages of the game allocative efficiency levels consistently approach 100{\%}, regardless of how the chief comes to acquire centricity in the group. We conclude that reciprocity and redistribution can seldom allocate resources efficiently in the absence of norms of symmetry and centricity in the institutional design. By way of comparison, we confirm a robust finding in the experimental economics literature that a simple market exchange game achieves high efficiency, even when the traders can formulate expectations about each other’s compliance with norms.",
author = "Giuseppe Danese and Luigi Mittone",
year = "2015",
month = "8",
day = "10",
doi = "10.1177/1043463114561754",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "27",
pages = "259--282",
journal = "Rationality and Society",
issn = "1043-4631",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "3",

}

Norms and trades : An experimental investigation. / Danese, Giuseppe; Mittone, Luigi.

En: Rationality and Society, Vol. 27, N.º 3, 10.08.2015, p. 259-282.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Norms and trades

T2 - An experimental investigation

AU - Danese, Giuseppe

AU - Mittone, Luigi

PY - 2015/8/10

Y1 - 2015/8/10

N2 - In this paper we study how norms of symmetry and centricity affect the functioning of two ways to allocate resources described in the economic anthropology literature, namely reciprocity and redistribution. The baseline reciprocity study, with no explicit priming of the norm of symmetry, features near-zero levels of allocative efficiency. Consistent with the anthropological framework we use throughout, we find that priming the norm of symmetry among the players through pre-play communication dramatically increases efficiency. Next we study a game of redistribution and find that in the final stages of the game allocative efficiency levels consistently approach 100%, regardless of how the chief comes to acquire centricity in the group. We conclude that reciprocity and redistribution can seldom allocate resources efficiently in the absence of norms of symmetry and centricity in the institutional design. By way of comparison, we confirm a robust finding in the experimental economics literature that a simple market exchange game achieves high efficiency, even when the traders can formulate expectations about each other’s compliance with norms.

AB - In this paper we study how norms of symmetry and centricity affect the functioning of two ways to allocate resources described in the economic anthropology literature, namely reciprocity and redistribution. The baseline reciprocity study, with no explicit priming of the norm of symmetry, features near-zero levels of allocative efficiency. Consistent with the anthropological framework we use throughout, we find that priming the norm of symmetry among the players through pre-play communication dramatically increases efficiency. Next we study a game of redistribution and find that in the final stages of the game allocative efficiency levels consistently approach 100%, regardless of how the chief comes to acquire centricity in the group. We conclude that reciprocity and redistribution can seldom allocate resources efficiently in the absence of norms of symmetry and centricity in the institutional design. By way of comparison, we confirm a robust finding in the experimental economics literature that a simple market exchange game achieves high efficiency, even when the traders can formulate expectations about each other’s compliance with norms.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84938885708&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84938885708&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/1043463114561754

DO - 10.1177/1043463114561754

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84938885708

VL - 27

SP - 259

EP - 282

JO - Rationality and Society

JF - Rationality and Society

SN - 1043-4631

IS - 3

ER -