Resumen
What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might favor incumbents. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increases money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010–2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust in regard to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, I present evidence that goes against other common explanations found in the literature and that goes in line with the clientelism mechanism.
Título traducido de la contribución | Desastres naturales y clientelism: el caso de las inundaciones y los deslizamientos en Colombia |
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Idioma original | Inglés |
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 73-88 |
Número de páginas | 16 |
Publicación | Electoral Studies |
Volumen | 55 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - oct. 1 2018 |
Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus
- Ciencias políticas y relaciones internacionales