Multiproduct retailing and buyer power: The effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior

Título traducido de la contribución: La venta al por menor de productos múltiples y el poder de compra: Los efectos de la exclusión de productos de la lista en el comportamiento de compra de los consumidores

Jorge Florez-Acosta, Daniel Herrera-Araujo

Resultado de la investigación: Documento de Trabajo

Resumen

Este documento examina empíricamente los efectos de la eliminación de productos de la lista en el comportamiento de compra de los consumidores en un contexto de venta al por menor de comestibles por parte de grandes cadenas de supermercados multiproducto. Se dice que un producto es excluido de la lista cuando un supermercado deja de suministrarlo mientras continúa siendo vendido por tiendas de la competencia. Desarrollamos un modelo de demanda en el cual los consumidores pueden comprar múltiples productos en el mismo período. Los consumidores tienen patrones de compra heterogéneos: algunos consideran que es óptimo concentrar las compras en una sola tienda, mientras que otros prefieren abastecerse en varios supermercados separados. Damos cuenta de esta heterogeneidad introduciendo los costes de compra, que son los costes de transacción de tratar con los proveedores. Utilizando datos de escáneres sobre las compras de comestibles de los hogares franceses en 2005, estimamos los parámetros del modelo y recuperamos la distribución de los costes de compra. El coste total de compra por tienda es de 1,79 e de media. Cuando simulamos la eliminación de un producto de la lista de un supermercado, encontramos que la probabilidad de los clientes de abastecerse en esa tienda disminuye mientras que la probabilidad de abastecerse en tiendas de la competencia aumenta. La reducción de la demanda es considerablemente mayor cuando los consumidores tienen fuertes sentimientos de lealtad hacia la marca excluida de la lista. Esto sugiere que los minoristas pueden estar perjudicándose a sí mismos, y no sólo a los fabricantes, cuando eliminan un producto de la lista. Sin embargo, cuando los clientes son fieles a la tienda, estos efectos son menores, lo que sugiere que inducir la fidelidad de los clientes a la tienda (por ejemplo, a través de marcas de distribuidor y programas de fidelidad) parece tener un efecto en las negociaciones verticales y, en particular, permite a los minoristas poderosos imponer restricciones verticales a los fabricantes.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Volumen2017-16
EstadoPublished - 2017

Series de publicaciones

NombrePSE Working Papers
EditorParis School of Economics
N.º2017-16

Huella dactilar

Shopping behavior
Buyer power
Retailing
Delisting
Shopping
Supermarkets
Costs
Purchase
Sourcing
Retailers
Suppliers
Grocery
Household
Grocery retailing
Store loyalty
Transaction costs
Vertical restraints
Scanner data

Citar esto

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abstract = "This paper empirically examines the effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior in a context of grocery retailing by large multiproduct supermarket chains. A product is said to be delisted when a supermarket stops supplying it while it continuous being sold by competing stores. We develop a model of demand in which consumers can purchase multiple products in the same period. Consumers have heterogeneous shopping patterns: some find it optimal to concentrate purchases at a single store while others prefer sourcing several separate supermarkets. We account for this heterogeneity by introducing shopping costs, which are transaction costs of dealing with suppliers. Using scanner data on grocery purchases by French households in 2005, we estimate the parameters of the model and retrieve the distribution of shopping costs. We find a total shopping cost per store sourced of 1.79 € on average. When we simulate the delisting of a product by one supermarket, we find that customers’probability of sourcing that store decreases while the probability of sourcing competing stores increases. The reduction in demand is considerably larger when consumers have strong preferences for the delisted brand. This suggests that retailers may be hurting themselves, and not only manufacturers, when they delist a product. However, when customers have strong preferences for the store such effects are lower, suggesting that inducing store loyalty in customers appears to have an effect on vertical negotiations and, in particular, it enables powerful retailers to impose vertical restraints on manufacturers.",
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Multiproduct retailing and buyer power: The effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior. / Florez-Acosta, Jorge; Herrera-Araujo, Daniel.

2017. (PSE Working Papers; N.º 2017-16).

Resultado de la investigación: Documento de Trabajo

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