Informed entry in auctions

Diego Aycinena, Hernán Bejarano, Lucas Rentschler

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)175-205
Número de páginas31
PublicaciónInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volumen47
N.º1
DOI
EstadoPublished - 2018

Huella dactilar

auction
willingness to pay
Auctions
Costs
Exceed
participation
costs
Willingness-to-pay
Participation
Values
Participation costs

Citar esto

Aycinena, Diego ; Bejarano, Hernán ; Rentschler, Lucas. / Informed entry in auctions. En: International Journal of Game Theory. 2018 ; Vol. 47, N.º 1. pp. 175-205.
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Informed entry in auctions. / Aycinena, Diego; Bejarano, Hernán; Rentschler, Lucas.

En: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 47, N.º 1, 2018, p. 175-205.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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AB - We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.

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