Incumbent and entrant response to regulated competition: Signalling with accounting costs and market prices

Jesús Otero; Catherine Waddams Price

doi:10.1016/S0148-6195(00)00053-9

Incumbent and entrant response to regulated competition: Signalling with accounting costs and market prices

Título traducido de la contribución: Respuesta de los titulares y entrantes a la competencia regulada: señalización con costos contables y precios de mercado

Jesús Otero, Catherine Waddams Price

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

6 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Los precios relativos cobrados por los operadores tradicionales se han convertido en una cuestión estratégica a medida que se introduce la competencia en mercados regulados que antes eran atendidos por un proveedor monopolista. Informamos sobre el comportamiento del operador establecido y los entrantes en el mercado de gas residencial del Reino Unido, donde el regulador ha realizado varias investigaciones para determinar si los precios relativos del operador establecido constituyen una discriminación indebida. Identificamos la política del regulador, el uso estratégico de la asignación de costos tanto por parte del regulador como del operador establecido, y los costos implícitos en los precios de los entrantes. Deducimos que el comportamiento de los entrantes respalda los argumentos de asignación de costos del operador establecido más que los del regulador.

Título traducido de la contribución	Respuesta de los titulares y entrantes a la competencia regulada: señalización con costos contables y precios de mercado
Idioma original	Inglés estadounidense
Páginas (desde-hasta)	209 - 223
Número de páginas	15
Publicación	Journal of Economics and Business
Volumen	53
N.º	2-3
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-6195(00)00053-9
Estado	Publicada - 2001

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

Administración de Empresas y Contabilidad General
Economía y econometría

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title = "Incumbent and entrant response to regulated competition: Signalling with accounting costs and market prices",

abstract = "Relative prices charged by incumbents have become a strategic issue as competition is introduced into regulated markets which were previously served by a monopoly supplier. We report on the behavior of the incumbent and entrants in the residential UK gas market, where the regulator has made several investigations into whether the incumbent{\textquoteright}s relative prices constitute undue discrimination. We identify the regulator{\textquoteright}s policy, the strategic use of cost allocation by both the regulator and the incumbent, and the costs implied by entrants{\textquoteright} prices. We deduce that the entrants{\textquoteright} behavior provides support for the incumbent{\textquoteright}s cost allocation arguments rather than those of the regulator.",

author = "Jes{\'u}s Otero and Price, {Catherine Waddams}",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful for financial support for this research from the Gas Consumers Council, the Energy Action Grants Agency Charitable Trust, British Gas Trading and the Leverhulme Trust (award number F215/AX). We should like to thank colleagues at the Centre for Management under Regulation and two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments, and most especially Lin Fitzgerald for her very helpful suggestions. All responsibility for the analysis and interpretation of data reported here rests with the authors. ",

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N2 - Relative prices charged by incumbents have become a strategic issue as competition is introduced into regulated markets which were previously served by a monopoly supplier. We report on the behavior of the incumbent and entrants in the residential UK gas market, where the regulator has made several investigations into whether the incumbent’s relative prices constitute undue discrimination. We identify the regulator’s policy, the strategic use of cost allocation by both the regulator and the incumbent, and the costs implied by entrants’ prices. We deduce that the entrants’ behavior provides support for the incumbent’s cost allocation arguments rather than those of the regulator.

AB - Relative prices charged by incumbents have become a strategic issue as competition is introduced into regulated markets which were previously served by a monopoly supplier. We report on the behavior of the incumbent and entrants in the residential UK gas market, where the regulator has made several investigations into whether the incumbent’s relative prices constitute undue discrimination. We identify the regulator’s policy, the strategic use of cost allocation by both the regulator and the incumbent, and the costs implied by entrants’ prices. We deduce that the entrants’ behavior provides support for the incumbent’s cost allocation arguments rather than those of the regulator.

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Incumbent and entrant response to regulated competition: Signalling with accounting costs and market prices

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