Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

Paula Jaramillo, Çaǧatay Kayi, Flip Klijn

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

4 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences).

Idioma originalInglés estadounidense
Páginas (desde-hasta)693-701
Número de páginas9
PublicaciónGames and Economic Behavior
Volumen82
DOI
EstadoPublicada - nov 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finanzas
  • Economía y econometría

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