Resumen
I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.
Idioma original | Inglés estadounidense |
---|---|
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 300-329 |
Número de páginas | 30 |
Publicación | International Journal of the Commons |
Volumen | 12 |
N.º | 2 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - ene. 1 2018 |
Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus
- Sociología y ciencias políticas