Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas

A survey of experimental research

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

Resumen

I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.

Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)300-329
Número de páginas30
PublicaciónInternational Journal of the Commons
Volumen12
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublished - ene 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Citar esto

@article{b053a21a09ee4692bb82b549eb735206,
title = "Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas: A survey of experimental research",
abstract = "I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.",
author = "C{\'e}sar Mantilla",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.18352/ijc.857",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "12",
pages = "300--329",
journal = "International Journal of the Commons",
issn = "1875-0281",
publisher = "International Association for the Study of the Commons",
number = "2",

}

Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas : A survey of experimental research. / Mantilla, César.

En: International Journal of the Commons, Vol. 12, N.º 2, 01.01.2018, p. 300-329.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas

T2 - A survey of experimental research

AU - Mantilla, César

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.

AB - I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85054517225&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85054517225&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.18352/ijc.857

DO - 10.18352/ijc.857

M3 - Article

VL - 12

SP - 300

EP - 329

JO - International Journal of the Commons

JF - International Journal of the Commons

SN - 1875-0281

IS - 2

ER -