Self-enforcing clientelism

Título traducido de la contribución: El clientelismo autoexigente

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

3 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

El clientelismo político es una relación diádica en la que un político (el patrón) da bienes y servicios materiales a un ciudadano (el cliente), a cambio de apoyo político. Si, en diferentes etapas de esta relación, tanto el patrocinador como el cliente tienen incentivos para desertar y no cumplir con los acuerdos informales, ¿qué hace que el clientelismo sea autoexigente? El siguiente artículo presenta un modelo teórico de clientelismo político en el que un candidato disciplina a la mayoría de los votantes a través de la promesa de un flujo futuro de beneficios. Una estrategia mixta que implica una asignación aleatoria de recursos entre las circunscripciones electorales hace que el clientelismo sea factible cuando la acción del político depende del resultado de las elecciones. Los mayores presupuestos de campaña y la menor aversión de los votantes hacia los partidos clientelistas, así como la mayor paciencia y la mayor heterogeneidad entre los grupos de votantes, hacen que el clientelismo sea más probable. Los votantes indecisos tienden a ser superdotados con más frecuencia que los partidarios principales, y esta frecuencia aumenta a medida que aumenta la heterogeneidad de los grupos, lo que presenta una asociación positiva.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)401-427
Número de páginas27
PublicaciónJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volumen27
N.º3
DOI
EstadoPublished - ene 1 2015

Huella dactilar

clientelism
politician
political support
voter
budget
candidacy
Group
campaign
election
incentive
citizen
politics
resources

Citar esto

Gallego, Jorge. / Self-enforcing clientelism. En: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2015 ; Vol. 27, N.º 3. pp. 401-427.
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Self-enforcing clientelism. / Gallego, Jorge.

En: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 27, N.º 3, 01.01.2015, p. 401-427.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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