Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing

Diego Aycinena, Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg, Lucas Rentschler

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículo de Investigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

Conventional wisdom suggests that promising free information to an agent would crowd out costly information acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case in which priors are symmetric. Indeed, when priors are asymmetric, a promise of free information in the future induces agents to increase information acquisition. In the lab, we test whether such crowding out occurs for both symmetric and asymmetric priors. Our results are qualitatively in line with the predictions: When priors are asymmetric, the promise of future free information induces subjects to acquire more costly information.

Idioma originalInglés estadounidense
Páginas (desde-hasta)182-195
Número de páginas14
PublicaciónGames and Economic Behavior
Volumen141
DOI
EstadoPublicada - sep. 2023

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

  • Finanzas
  • Economía y econometría

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