Competition and the Hold‐Up Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts

Resultado de la investigación: Working paperDocumento de trabajo


This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Moreover, lowering the outcome competitiveness is not always Pareto dominant for the par- ties offering the contracts and larger social welfare can be obtained with low competitive equilibria.
Idioma originalInglés estadounidense
Número de páginas52
EstadoPublicada - mar 2014
Publicado de forma externa

Series de publicaciones

NombreTSE Working Papers
EditorToulouse School of Economics

    Huella digital

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economía, econometría y finanzas (todo)

Citar esto

Roig , G. (2014). Competition and the Hold‐Up Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts. (pp. 1-52). (TSE Working Papers; Vol. 14, N.º 481).