TY - JOUR

T1 - Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

AU - Kayi, Çaǧatay

AU - Ramaekers, Eve

N1 - Funding Information:
✩ We thank Paulo Barelli, Walter Bossert, Philippe Chevalier, Santanu Dey, Aytek Erdil, François Maniquet, Manipushpak Mitra, Hervé Moulin, Hans Peters, Jay Sethuraman, William Thomson, Gábor Virág, seminar participants at the University of Maastricht, Social Choice and Welfare Conference 2006, University of Rochester, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions, comments, or suggestions. The first author thanks the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for its support under grant VIDI-452-06-013. * Corresponding author. Fax: +32 10 474301. E-mail addresses: C.Kayi@maastrichtuniversity.nl (Ç. Kayı), eve.ramaekers@uclouvain.be (E. Ramaekers).
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2010/1

Y1 - 2010/1

N2 - A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a priori arbitrarily exclude agents from positions. As one may not know agents' waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare or symmetry, and strategy-proofness. It satisfies stronger axioms, as no-envy and anonymity. Further, its desirability extends to related problems. To obtain these results, we prove that a rule, single-valued or not, satisfies queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness if and only if it always selects efficient queues and sets transfers à la Groves [Groves, T., 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617-631]. This holds in other problems, provided the domain of quasi-linear preferences is rich enough.

AB - A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a priori arbitrarily exclude agents from positions. As one may not know agents' waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare or symmetry, and strategy-proofness. It satisfies stronger axioms, as no-envy and anonymity. Further, its desirability extends to related problems. To obtain these results, we prove that a rule, single-valued or not, satisfies queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness if and only if it always selects efficient queues and sets transfers à la Groves [Groves, T., 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617-631]. This holds in other problems, provided the domain of quasi-linear preferences is rich enough.

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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.003

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.003

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:72049118182

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 68

SP - 220

EP - 232

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -