Between-group competition, intra-group cooperation and relative performance

Juan C. Cárdenas, César Mantilla

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

13 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Reportamos los resultados de un nuevo experimento de bienes públicos con un dilema de cooperación intra-grupo y competencia intergrupal. En nuestro diseño, los sujetos reciben información sobre su desempeño individual y grupal relativo después de cada ronda con una competencia grupal no incentivada y luego incentivada. Encontramos que, en promedio, los individuos con bajo rendimiento relativo reducen sus contribuciones al bien público, pero los grupos con bajo rendimiento aumentan las suyas. Con la competencia incentivada, en la que la clasificación relativa del grupo aumenta los resultados individuales, la reacción al rendimiento relativo es mayor con los individuos que contribuyen más al grupo; además, observamos que la varianza de las estrategias disminuye a medida que aumentan las clasificaciones individuales y grupales. Estos resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre cómo la comparación social da forma a reacciones similares en los juegos con diferentes incentivos para el rendimiento del grupo y cómo la competencia y la cooperación pueden influirse mutuamente.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
PublicaciónFrontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
DOI
EstadoPublished - feb 17 2015
Publicado de forma externa

Huella dactilar

Motivation

Citar esto

@article{0c91704c250345978c56f4219a386ef3,
title = "Between-group competition, intra-group cooperation and relative performance",
abstract = "We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation dilemma and inter-group competition. In our design subjects receive information about their relative individual and group performance after each round with non-incentivized and then incentivized group competition. We found that, on average, individuals with low relative performance reduce their contributions to the public good, but groups with low performance increase theirs. With incentivized competition, where the relative ranking of the group increases individual payoffs, the reaction to relative performance is larger with individuals contributing more to the group; further, we observe that the variance of strategies decreases as individual and group rankings increase. These results offer new insights on how social comparison shapes similar reactions in games with different incentives for group performance and how competition and cooperation can influence each other.",
author = "C{\'a}rdenas, {Juan C.} and C{\'e}sar Mantilla",
year = "2015",
month = "2",
day = "17",
doi = "10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00033",
language = "English (US)",
journal = "Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience",
issn = "1662-5153",
publisher = "Frontiers Research Foundation",

}

Between-group competition, intra-group cooperation and relative performance. / Cárdenas, Juan C.; Mantilla, César.

En: Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 17.02.2015.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Between-group competition, intra-group cooperation and relative performance

AU - Cárdenas, Juan C.

AU - Mantilla, César

PY - 2015/2/17

Y1 - 2015/2/17

N2 - We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation dilemma and inter-group competition. In our design subjects receive information about their relative individual and group performance after each round with non-incentivized and then incentivized group competition. We found that, on average, individuals with low relative performance reduce their contributions to the public good, but groups with low performance increase theirs. With incentivized competition, where the relative ranking of the group increases individual payoffs, the reaction to relative performance is larger with individuals contributing more to the group; further, we observe that the variance of strategies decreases as individual and group rankings increase. These results offer new insights on how social comparison shapes similar reactions in games with different incentives for group performance and how competition and cooperation can influence each other.

AB - We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation dilemma and inter-group competition. In our design subjects receive information about their relative individual and group performance after each round with non-incentivized and then incentivized group competition. We found that, on average, individuals with low relative performance reduce their contributions to the public good, but groups with low performance increase theirs. With incentivized competition, where the relative ranking of the group increases individual payoffs, the reaction to relative performance is larger with individuals contributing more to the group; further, we observe that the variance of strategies decreases as individual and group rankings increase. These results offer new insights on how social comparison shapes similar reactions in games with different incentives for group performance and how competition and cooperation can influence each other.

U2 - 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00033

DO - 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00033

M3 - Article

C2 - 25741258

JO - Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience

JF - Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience

SN - 1662-5153

ER -