TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
AU - Jaramillo, Paula
AU - Kayi, Çaǧatay
AU - Klijn, Flip
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.
Copyright:
Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
AB - We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8
DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84924407964
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 43
SP - 603
EP - 633
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 3
ER -