Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Çaǧatay Kayi, Flip Klijn

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

2 Citas (Scopus)


We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Idioma originalInglés estadounidense
Páginas (desde-hasta)603-633
Número de páginas31
PublicaciónSocial Choice and Welfare
EstadoPublicada - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Ciencias sociales (miscelánea)
  • Economía y econometría


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