TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
AU - Jaramillo, Paula
AU - Kayi, Çaǧatay
AU - Klijn, Flip
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank Tommy Andersson, Vikram Manjunath, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee for detailed comments on an earlier draft of the paper. We also thank the seminar participants at Universidad de Los Andes, Bilkent University, Universidad del Rosario, Maastricht University, UECE Lisbon meeting 2011, JOLATE XII, REES Bilbao, First Caribbean Game Theory Conference, Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), GAMES 2012, Latin American Workshop in Economic Theory, and Durham University Business School for valuable discussions. Ç. Kayı gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and financial support from CSIC/Colciencias through grant 2010CO0013 and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011–29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075).
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.
PY - 2014/10
Y1 - 2014/10
N2 - We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
AB - We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8
DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84924407964
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 43
SP - 603
EP - 633
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 3
ER -