Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Çaǧatay Kayi, Flip Klijn

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

1 Cita (Scopus)

Resumen

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)603-633
Número de páginas31
PublicaciónSocial Choice and Welfare
DOI
EstadoPublished - ene 1 2014

Huella dactilar

guarantee
budget
money
welfare
Budget constraint
Owners
Government
Guarantee
Strategic behavior

Citar esto

@article{88660000b593468c87aa2f5d89ddf0e8,
title = "Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint",
abstract = "{\circledC} Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.",
author = "Paula Jaramillo and {\cC}aǧatay Kayi and Flip Klijn",
year = "2014",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "603--633",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer New York",

}

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. / Jaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çaǧatay; Klijn, Flip.

En: Social Choice and Welfare, 01.01.2014, p. 603-633.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

AU - Jaramillo, Paula

AU - Kayi, Çaǧatay

AU - Klijn, Flip

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

AB - © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8

DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8

M3 - Article

SP - 603

EP - 633

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

ER -