Does the Unemployment Benefit Institution Affect the Productivity of Workers? Evidence from the Field

Título traducido de la contribución: ¿Afecta la Institución de Prestaciones por Desempleo a la Productividad de los Trabajadores? Evidencia en el campo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

1 Cita (Scopus)

Resumen

El presente documento estudia los efectos de los regímenes de prestaciones de desempleo en la productividad individual. Creamos empleo y desempleo en el campo y comparamos la productividad de los trabajadores sin beneficios de desempleo con la productividad bajo dos esquemas de desempleo diferentes. En un plan, los desempleados recibieron una transferencia monetaria incondicional. En el otro, la transferencia monetaria se obtuvo a condición de que los desempleados pasaran algún tiempo en una actividad auxiliar. Nuestros resultados desafían la predicción de la teoría económica estándar de que los beneficios de desempleo, especialmente las compensaciones incondicionales, obstaculizan el esfuerzo de los trabajadores. Encontramos que los trabajadores empleados bajo el esquema incondicional son más productivos que los trabajadores bajo el esquema condicional, y ambos esquemas hacen que los trabajadores sean más productivos que no tener ningún beneficio de desempleo. Discutimos dos posibles explicaciones de nuestros resultados basadas en la reciprocidad y los costes psicológicos diferenciales del desempleo en todos los regímenes de prestaciones de desempleo.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)1 - 18
PublicaciónManagement Science
DOI
EstadoPublished - 2016

Huella dactilar

Unemployment benefits
Productivity
Workers
Unemployment
Workers' compensation
Costs
Psychological
Prediction
Economic theory

Citar esto

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title = "Does the Unemployment Benefit Institution Affect the Productivity of Workers? Evidence from the Field",
abstract = "This paper studies the effects of unemployment benefit schemes on individual productivity. We created employment and unemployment in the field and compared workers’ productivity under no unemployment benefits to productivity under two different unemployment schemes. In one scheme, the unemployed received an unconditional monetary transfer. In the other, the monetary transfer was obtained conditional on the unemployed spending some time on an ancillary activity. Our results challenge the standard economic theory prediction that unemployment benefits, especially unconditional compensations, hinder workers’ effort. We find that workers employed under the unconditional scheme are more productive than workers under the conditional one, and both schemes make workers more productive than having no unemployment benefit. We discuss two possible explanations for our results based on reciprocity and differential psychological costs of unemployment across unemployment benefit schemes.",
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Does the Unemployment Benefit Institution Affect the Productivity of Workers? Evidence from the Field. / Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Blanco, Mariana; Dalton, Patricio S. .

En: Management Science, 2016, p. 1 - 18 .

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

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AU - Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando

AU - Blanco, Mariana

AU - Dalton, Patricio S.

PY - 2016

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N2 - This paper studies the effects of unemployment benefit schemes on individual productivity. We created employment and unemployment in the field and compared workers’ productivity under no unemployment benefits to productivity under two different unemployment schemes. In one scheme, the unemployed received an unconditional monetary transfer. In the other, the monetary transfer was obtained conditional on the unemployed spending some time on an ancillary activity. Our results challenge the standard economic theory prediction that unemployment benefits, especially unconditional compensations, hinder workers’ effort. We find that workers employed under the unconditional scheme are more productive than workers under the conditional one, and both schemes make workers more productive than having no unemployment benefit. We discuss two possible explanations for our results based on reciprocity and differential psychological costs of unemployment across unemployment benefit schemes.

AB - This paper studies the effects of unemployment benefit schemes on individual productivity. We created employment and unemployment in the field and compared workers’ productivity under no unemployment benefits to productivity under two different unemployment schemes. In one scheme, the unemployed received an unconditional monetary transfer. In the other, the monetary transfer was obtained conditional on the unemployed spending some time on an ancillary activity. Our results challenge the standard economic theory prediction that unemployment benefits, especially unconditional compensations, hinder workers’ effort. We find that workers employed under the unconditional scheme are more productive than workers under the conditional one, and both schemes make workers more productive than having no unemployment benefit. We discuss two possible explanations for our results based on reciprocity and differential psychological costs of unemployment across unemployment benefit schemes.

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