A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans Theo Normann

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

165 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Idioma originalEnglish (US)
Páginas (desde-hasta)321-338
Número de páginas18
PublicaciónGames and Economic Behavior
DOI
EstadoPublished - jun 1 2011

Huella dactilar

Inequality aversion
Other-regarding preferences
Predictive power
Experiment
Ultimatum game
Prisoners' dilemma
Hypothesis test
Dictator game

Citar esto

Blanco, Mariana ; Engelmann, Dirk ; Normann, Hans Theo. / A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. En: Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 ; pp. 321-338.
@article{bd28d5b918b7475b97ae5ff63f739fbd,
title = "A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences",
abstract = "We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. {\circledC} 2010 Elsevier Inc.",
author = "Mariana Blanco and Dirk Engelmann and Normann, {Hans Theo}",
year = "2011",
month = "6",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "321--338",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. / Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans Theo.

En: Games and Economic Behavior, 01.06.2011, p. 321-338.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a RevistaArtículo

TY - JOUR

T1 - A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

AU - Blanco, Mariana

AU - Engelmann, Dirk

AU - Normann, Hans Theo

PY - 2011/6/1

Y1 - 2011/6/1

N2 - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

AB - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences-inequality aversion-using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008

M3 - Article

SP - 321

EP - 338

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -