TY - JOUR
T1 - The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations
T2 - Evidence from the Pinochet Regime
AU - González, Felipe
AU - Prem, Mounu
AU - Urzúa, Francisco I.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank our discussants, Eric Hilt, Lakshmi Iyer, Paola Sapienza, and Jonathan Weigel, for their suggestions and Andrew Ellul for commenting on an early draft. We also thank Emanuele Colonnelli, Thiemo Fetzer, Gastón Illanes, Borja Larraín, Pablo Muñoz, Martín Rossi, Giorgo Sertsios, Rodrigo Soares, Juan F. Vargas, and seminar participants at various seminars and conferences. We have also benefited from conversations with politicians and army officers of the Pinochet regime and from information provided by Neville Blanc, Juan Carlos González, Miguel Landeros, and Marco Sepúlveda. We are grateful to the Center for Effective Global Action, the Economic History Association, Fondecyt (Project 11170258), and the Stanford Center for International Development for financial support. Katia Everke, Benjamin Leiva, Piera Sedini, and Cristine von Dessauer provided outstanding research assistance.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Economic History Association 2020.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/6/1
Y1 - 2020/6/1
N2 - We show that the sale of state-owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet's privatizations in Chile and find that some firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms.
AB - We show that the sale of state-owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet's privatizations in Chile and find that some firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0022050719000780
DO - 10.1017/S0022050719000780
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85079215310
SN - 0022-0507
VL - 80
SP - 417
EP - 456
JO - Journal of Economic History
JF - Journal of Economic History
IS - 2
ER -