Abstract
In this paper it is argued that Quine's critic of Carnap's radical reductionism ("the second dogma of empiricism") is based on an incomplete comprehension of the project that Carnap pursued in the Aufbau. This paper offers a novel interpretation of the twelve steps that Carnap proposed for the construction of physical objects. Further, a recent proposal of Thomas Mormann concerning this issue is criticized.
| Translated title of the contribution | The constitution of physical objects in the Aufbau: Quine against carnap |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 51-76 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Critica-Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 124 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2010 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy