Searching for the intentional dimension of emotions and moods

Within the framework of John Searle's theory of intentionality, the paper focuses on how emotions and moods can be analyzed as intentional mental states, as long as intentionality is not considered merely as a relation of "aboutness" between a subject's mental state and objects or events in the world. The article criticizes Searle's theory and shows that mental states are embodied and situated. For an embodied and situated mind, emotions and moods are not merely mechanical reactions of an objectified body, but rather, exhibit features of intentionality that are not necessarily conscious and that pertain to concrete existential problems. It is also argued that philosophy needs to consider empirical questions arising from various particular sciences and that psychiatry needs to engage with conceptual questions related to the problem of intentionality, as it constitutes one of the central problems in the philosophy of mind. The benefit of this interdisciplinary encounter will be a better understanding of the human mind.