Abstract
This paper offers a defense against two accusations according to which libertarianism incurs in a category-mistake. The philosophy of Gilbert Ryle will be used to explain the reasons which ground these accusations. Further, it will be shown why, although certain sorts of libertarianism based on agent-causation or Cartesian dualism incur in these mistakes, there is at least one version of libertarianism to which this criticism does not necessarily apply: the version that seeks to find in physical indeterminism the grounding of human free will.
| Translated title of the contribution | Libertarianism & Category-Mistake |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 141-168 |
| Journal | Ideas y Valores |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue number | 141 |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |