Investment in transport infrastructure, regulation, and gas-gas competition

Farid Gasmi, Juan Daniel Oviedo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model in which a regulated (upstream) transporter provides capacity to a marketer competing in output with an incumbent in the (downstream) gas commodity market. The equilibrium outcome of the firms' interaction in the downstream market is explicitly taken into account by the regulator when setting the transport charge. We consider various forms of competition in this market and derive the corresponding optimal transport charge policies. We then run simulations that allow us to perform a comparative welfare analysis of these transport infrastructure investment policies based on different assumptions about the intensity of the competition that prevails in the gas commodity market.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)726-736
Number of pages11
JournalEnergy Economics
Volume32
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Energy(all)

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