TY - JOUR
T1 - Informed entry in auctions
AU - Aycinena, Diego
AU - Bejarano, Hernán
AU - Rentschler, Lucas
N1 - Funding Information:
Financial support from the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics (IFREE) is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Jorge Chang Urrea, Pedro Monzón Alvarado, Diego Fernandez and Maximilian Pfeifer for outstanding research assistance. We have benefited from comments and suggestions from participants in seminars at Universidad Francisco Marroquín, Florida State University, the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University, CeDEx at the University of Nottingham, the University of California at Santa Barbara, the Antigua Experimental Economics Conference, and the North-American ESA conference.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.
Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2018/3/1
Y1 - 2018/3/1
N2 - We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.
AB - We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85023742293
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85023742293&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
DO - 10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
M3 - Research Article
AN - SCOPUS:85023742293
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 47
SP - 175
EP - 205
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 1
ER -