Informed entry in auctions

Diego Aycinena, Hernán Bejarano, Lucas Rentschler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)175-205
Number of pages31
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume47
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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