Abstract
This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.
| Translated title of the contribution | Gas release as a short term instrument to foster competition |
|---|---|
| Original language | French |
| Pages (from-to) | 475-486 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Revue Economique |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2008 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
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