Foreign Investors and the Colombian Peace Process

Enrique Alberto Prieto Rios, Andrei Gomez-Suarez, Nicolas M Perrone

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The International Investment Regime (IIR) materialises in international arbitral tribunals that protect the rights of foreign investors. Could these tribunals hamper the implementation of exceptional measures agreed to end armed conflicts? The principle of proportionality, usually employed to balance competing demands such as the interests of international investors and the right of states to self-determination, could fall short when it comes to the concept of a nation and a society’s right to peace. Focusing on the Colombian peace process, this article argues that the agreement on land redistribution, a cornerstone of the peace agreements, benefits the whole society, including foreign investors. However, the colonialist nature of the IIR could lead foreign investors, who see their investments and expected profits affected, to demand compensation for governmental land acquisition. The Colombian case suggests powerful lessons for the willingness of transitional states to defend their people’s right to peace in international tribunals.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)223 - 247
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Community Law Review
Volume18
Issue number3-4
StatePublished - 2016

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peace process
investor
peace
proportionality
self-determination
redistribution
profit
demand
Society

Cite this

Prieto Rios, E. A., Gomez-Suarez, A., & Perrone, N. M. (2016). Foreign Investors and the Colombian Peace Process. International Community Law Review, 18(3-4), 223 - 247.
Prieto Rios, Enrique Alberto ; Gomez-Suarez, Andrei ; Perrone, Nicolas M. / Foreign Investors and the Colombian Peace Process. In: International Community Law Review. 2016 ; Vol. 18, No. 3-4. pp. 223 - 247.
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Prieto Rios, EA, Gomez-Suarez, A & Perrone, NM 2016, 'Foreign Investors and the Colombian Peace Process', International Community Law Review, vol. 18, no. 3-4, pp. 223 - 247.

Foreign Investors and the Colombian Peace Process. / Prieto Rios, Enrique Alberto; Gomez-Suarez, Andrei; Perrone, Nicolas M.

In: International Community Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 3-4, 2016, p. 223 - 247.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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