Environmental uncertainty in commons dilemmas: A survey of experimental research

César Mantilla

Research output: Contribution to journalResearch Articlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)300-329
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Journal of the Commons
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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