Abstract
I conducted a systematic review of experimental resource dilemma studies that manipulated environmental uncertainty. I classify the collected studies according to whether the incentives reflected a coordination or a cooperation problem. I provide, for each type of incentive, a general overview of the strategic setting and its adaptation to the experimental paradigm. I find that, regardless of the type of incentives, environmental uncertainty has an efficiency-diminishing effect in most of the experimental settings. I also present and discuss a selective set of experiments mimicking the climate change problem, in which the proposed incentives combine elements from coordination and cooperation problems. I conclude with a general discussion of the findings about how different sources of environmental uncertainty affect efficiency in collective action problems, paying special attention to climate change issues.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 300-329 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | International Journal of the Commons |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2018 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science