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School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
Paula Jaramillo
,
Cagatay Kayi
, Flip Klijn
Faculty of Economics Research Group
Research output
:
Working paper
Overview
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Dive into the research topics of 'School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
School Choice
100%
Nash Implementation
100%
Stable Matching
100%
Priority Mechanism
100%
Matching Theorem
33%
Public Schools
16%
Incomplete Information
16%
School Choice Problem
16%
Impossibility Results
16%
Assignment Mechanism
16%
Boston
16%
Immediate Acceptance Mechanism
16%
Fair Matching
16%
Mathematics
Stable Matching
100%
Main Result
100%
Incomplete Information
50%