TY - JOUR
T1 - Communication networks in common-pool resource games
T2 - Field experimental evidence
AU - Mantilla, César
N1 - Funding Information:
I want to thank Juan Camilo Cárdenas and Pablo Brañas for their orientation and suggestions in writing this paper. I appreciate the very useful comments from Francisco Alpízar, Samuel Bowles, Fredrik Carlsson, Boris van Leeuwen, Jorge Maldonado, Bertil Tungodden, an anonymous reviewer, and the Scientific Committee of the Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program (LACEEP). I am grateful to Juana Castro, Maria Fernanda Pereira and Lorena Trujillo for their help collecting and processing the data. Experiments were conducted with a grant from LACEEP. Fundación Bolívar Davivienda provided financial support during the research. Support through ANR – Labex IAST is gratefully acknowledged.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2015/10/1
Y1 - 2015/10/1
N2 - We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, "bad" (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas "good" (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of "good" suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while "bad" suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting "good" and "bad" messages.
AB - We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects' payoffs. In a centralized network, "bad" (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas "good" (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of "good" suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while "bad" suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting "good" and "bad" messages.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84942535161
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 118
SP - 215
EP - 226
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -