Strategic Atrocities: Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia

Juan Fernando Vargas Duque, Charles H. Anderton, J. Brauer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Armed actors in civil war often target civilians to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This strategy secures collaboration with the perpetrator, strengthening its civilian support, and helps the consolidation of territorial supremacy over contested regions. In this chapter, I illustrate this strategic use of atrocities with a model involving two armed groups who fight over territorial control and who try to secure compliance of local civilians through a combination of carrots and sticks. I study the conditions that lead to more or less civilians killed and illustrate the main theoretical arguments with descriptive evidence from the recent history of Colombia’s civil war.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEconomic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention
Pages425 - 451
ISBN (Electronic)978-0 199378296
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

Fingerprint

Colombia
civil war
consolidation
evidence
anxiety
history
Group

Cite this

Vargas Duque, J. F., Anderton, C. H., & Brauer, J. (2016). Strategic Atrocities: Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia. In Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention (pp. 425 - 451 ) https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019
Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando ; Anderton, Charles H. ; Brauer, J. / Strategic Atrocities : Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia. Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention. 2016. pp. 425 - 451
@inbook{5c27313c6d1548d6ba8df61cf8ed9e8c,
title = "Strategic Atrocities: Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia",
abstract = "Armed actors in civil war often target civilians to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This strategy secures collaboration with the perpetrator, strengthening its civilian support, and helps the consolidation of territorial supremacy over contested regions. In this chapter, I illustrate this strategic use of atrocities with a model involving two armed groups who fight over territorial control and who try to secure compliance of local civilians through a combination of carrots and sticks. I study the conditions that lead to more or less civilians killed and illustrate the main theoretical arguments with descriptive evidence from the recent history of Colombia’s civil war.",
author = "{Vargas Duque}, {Juan Fernando} and Anderton, {Charles H.} and J. Brauer",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780199378296",
pages = "425 -- 451",
booktitle = "Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention",

}

Vargas Duque, JF, Anderton, CH & Brauer, J 2016, Strategic Atrocities: Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia. in Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention. pp. 425 - 451 . https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019

Strategic Atrocities : Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia. / Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Anderton, Charles H. ; Brauer, J.

Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention. 2016. p. 425 - 451 .

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

TY - CHAP

T1 - Strategic Atrocities

T2 - Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia

AU - Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando

AU - Anderton, Charles H.

AU - Brauer, J.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Armed actors in civil war often target civilians to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This strategy secures collaboration with the perpetrator, strengthening its civilian support, and helps the consolidation of territorial supremacy over contested regions. In this chapter, I illustrate this strategic use of atrocities with a model involving two armed groups who fight over territorial control and who try to secure compliance of local civilians through a combination of carrots and sticks. I study the conditions that lead to more or less civilians killed and illustrate the main theoretical arguments with descriptive evidence from the recent history of Colombia’s civil war.

AB - Armed actors in civil war often target civilians to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This strategy secures collaboration with the perpetrator, strengthening its civilian support, and helps the consolidation of territorial supremacy over contested regions. In this chapter, I illustrate this strategic use of atrocities with a model involving two armed groups who fight over territorial control and who try to secure compliance of local civilians through a combination of carrots and sticks. I study the conditions that lead to more or less civilians killed and illustrate the main theoretical arguments with descriptive evidence from the recent history of Colombia’s civil war.

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780199378296

SP - 425

EP - 451

BT - Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention

ER -

Vargas Duque JF, Anderton CH, Brauer J. Strategic Atrocities: Civilians under Crossfire - Theory and Evidence from Colombia. In Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention. 2016. p. 425 - 451 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378296.003.0019