© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
Jaramillo, P., Kayi, Ç., & Klijn, F. (2014). Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. Social Choice and Welfare, 603-633. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8