Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Çaǧatay Kayi, Flip Klijn

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Abstract

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)603-633
Number of pages31
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

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